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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS





                                                                Petitioner
v.
JOHN ASHCROFT, Attorney General of the United States,
                                                              Respondent
____________________________________
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals
(INS No.  A95-146-011)
_______________________________________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
March 26, 2004
Before: AMBRO, CHERTOFF and BECKER, 
Circuit Judges





This is a petition for review by Magda Fekry Asrail of an order of the Board of
Immigration Appeals, which affirmed, without a separate opinion (under the new
2“streamlining regulations”), the decision of the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying Asrail’s
applications for asylum and withholding of removal, and for protection under the
Convention Against Torture (“CAT” or “the Torture Convention”).  Asrail maintains that,
contrary to the IJ’s opinion, the record reflects sufficient credible evidence support of her
claims.  Referencing the stringent standard of review in these cases, the government
responds that substantial evidence supports the opinion of the IJ that Asrail failed to
present a credible asylum claim, primarily because of numerous material inconsistencies
and omissions throughout her written application and her testimony.  
Because Asrail has failed to argue her eligibility for withholding of removal and
protection under the CAT before the Board and before this Court, she has waived review
of these issues, and hence we shall confine our discussion to the asylum claim.  Because
the parties are fully familiar with the background facts and procedural history we need not
set them forth, except as necessary to explain our ratio decidendi.
I.
Asrail is a thirty-two year old female from Egypt, who is Coptic Orthodox
Christian.  She grounds her claim for asylum on several incidents she experienced in
Egypt which, she submits, were due to her religion.  More particularly, she contends that
she was persecuted by Islamic fundamentalists on account of her religious faith and her
employment with Benetton.  Her application states that the extremists “would wait for me
early in the morning when I was going to work or in the evening when I was returning
3from work.  They would abuse me by beating me and throwing me in the street.”
Asrail says that she came to the United States but returned to Egypt in 1999 and
was subjected to threats not to go back to work or practice any kind of activity at church. 
She represents that when she returned to Egypt again in 2000 after another sojourn in the
United States, two bearded men attacked her, snatched her chain with the attached cross,
beat her and started to rip her clothes off, and tried to force her into an empty house to
rape her.  Asrail states that her attackers fled when a man and woman were passing while
she was screaming, and that she was treated at a hospital and a report was filed at a police
station.
Asrail’s application also states that on April 16, 2001, the extremists called and
threatened to kill her.  She then fled to the United States on April 21, 2001.  She
maintains that after her departure to the United States her family was contacted by the
extremists and told that she would be killed if she returned to Egypt.
Along with her asylum application, Asrail submitted corroborating material,
including a police and hospital report, and articles on the persecution of Coptic Christians
in Egypt.  Her birth certificate states she is born of Coptic Christian parents.  Asrail
testified that she could not return to her home country and that if she were to return to
Egypt “my life will be in danger because somebody might try to attack me or rape me or
kill me.”  She attributes her persecution to the Gamaat Islamia, an Islamic group.  She
also testified that she was attacked a total of five times by this group—in August 1997,
4February 1998, August 1998, September 1999, and April 2001, though the incidents in
1997, 1998 and 1999 were not mentioned in her asylum application.
Asrail’s legal argument is that she is a refugee within INA § 101(a)(42)(A), who is
unwilling or unable to return to her country because of persecution or well-founded fear
of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a social group or
political opinion.  More specifically she contends that: (1) she is unable or unwilling to
return to her home country because of persecution and a well founded fear of persecution;
(b) the beatings, threats and attempted rape she suffered are persecution on account of her
religion; (c) her fear of persecution is well founded arising out of past persecution and
country conditions in Egypt; (d) her fear of persecution is well founded since her
government was unable or unwilling to control her persecutors; and (e) she suffered the
persecution on account of her religion—Coptic Orthodox Christian.
II.
The IJ’s decision held that Asrail had not provided credible evidence, hence failed
to meet her burden of proof and persuasion necessary to establish eligibility for any of the
remedies for which she applied.  Under our jurisprudence, we review the Board’s
decision as the final agency determination, see INA § 242(a)(1), except where, as here,
the Board of Immigration Appeals does not render its own opinion but simply affirms the
decision of an immigration judge.  In that instance, “the IJ’s opinion effectively becomes
the BIA’s, and, accordingly, a court must review the IJ’s decision.”  Abdulai v. Ashcroft,
5239 F.3d 542, 549 n.2 (3d Cir. 2001)(citing Chen v. INS, 87 F.3d 5, 7 n.3 (1st Cir. 1996)). 
The IJ’s factual determination that petitioner failed to offer sufficient evidence to
establish her eligibility for asylum is reviewed under the highly deferential “substantial
evidence” standard.  See Dia v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 228 (3d Cir. 2003).
To establish eligibility for asylum on the basis of past persecution, an alien must
show that she suffered some harm rising to the level of persecution on account of a
statutorily protected ground, and that it was committed by the government or forces the
government is unable or unwilling to control.  See Abdulrahman v. Ashcroft, 330 F.3d
587, 592 (3d Cir. 2003)(citing Chen Yun Gao v. Ashcroft, 299 F.3d 266, 272 (3d Cir.
2002)).  If past persecution is established,  the asylum applicant is entitled to a rebuttable
presumption of a well-founded fear of persecution.  See 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1).  Absent
evidence of past persecution, an alien can demonstrate a well-founded fear of future
persecution by showing that she “has a genuine fear, and that a reasonable person in her
circumstances would fear persecution if returned to her native country.”  Gao, 299 F.3d at
272 (citation omitted).  An applicant for asylum must therefore show that her fear of
persecution is both subjectively genuine and “supported by objective evidence that
persecution is a reasonable possibility.”  Chang v. INS, 119 F.3d 1055, 1066 (3d Cir.
1997) (citing INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 430 (1987)).  Ultimately, the alien
bears the burden of establishing an affirmative nexus between the past or future
persecution alleged and an enumerated characteristic under the INA.  See INA §
6101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A); 8 C.F.R. § 208.13; Chang, 119 F.3d at 1065.
In establishing her eligibility for asylum, an alien also has the burden of supporting
her claim through credible evidence.  Gao, 299 F.3d at 272.  The alien’s own testimony
alone may be sufficient to meet this burden if it is believable, consistent, and sufficiently
detailed to provide a plausible and coherent account of the basis of the claim.  See 8
C.F.R. § 208.13(a); Gao, 299 F.3d at 272.  In other words, as Asrail argues, corroboration
is not a sine qua non.
III.
We are satisfied that the IJ’s decision that Asrail was not credible was supported
by substantial evidence.  We itemize the following points in support of that conclusion:
1.  There were a number of inconsistencies between Asrail’s written asylum
application and her testimony to the Court.  Her asylum application represented that “the
only specific incident of alleged persecution took place on April 13th, 2001.”  But, at her
hearing, Asrail testified that she had been similarly assaulted on four other occasions: 
once in 1997; twice in 1998; and once in 1999.
2.  On direct examination, Asrail claimed to have resigned from her position with
Benetton following the 1999 assault “at least in part because she felt that the assaults
were caused by her employment with that company,” but she submitted a letter from her
former employer stating that she actually resigned from Benetton “because [the
Petitioner] wanted to pursue career opportunities outside of Egypt.”
73.  Asrail failed to reveal her unauthorized employment in the United States (as a
nanny) on her application for asylum.
4.  Asrail failed to corroborate critical aspects of her asylum claim.  For example,
she did not attempt to provide the hospital records or police reports that could substantiate
four of the five alleged assaults that made up the bases for her claim of past persecution
or submit any affidavits from the neighbors who allegedly witnessed the assaults.
5.  Although Asrail testified that her individual attackers were all members of a
particular “Islamic group,” she could not specifically identify or otherwise describe them,
other than to say that they had long beards and wore white shirts, and her report to the
police was not sufficiently detailed to identify “the names, identity or addresses of the
perpetrators.”  While this failure might be understandable, it contributes to Asrail’s
inability to show that she suffered past persecution in Egypt on account of her religion.
6.  Although Asrail contends that she was “beaten and attacked on five separate
occasions,” and that “[h]er persecutors delivered threatening phone calls during [a] short
trip Petitioner took to Egypt,” she offered, in support of her claim, only her own largely
uncorroborated testimony and various background documents, and in her application for
asylum, Asrail described in detail only one specific incident of alleged persecution.
7.  Although Asrail says that she is “readily identifiable” as a Coptic Orthodox
Christian, that identity does not automatically establish her persecution “on account of”
that characteristic.  Asrail presented no testimony indicating that her attackers were even
8aware of her religious affiliations or that her beliefs were in fact the motivation for the
assaults against her.  Indeed, the IJ concluded that the most recent and most serious attack
which Asrail described may have simply been a “criminal, sexual assault.”
8.  There is no evidence in the record demonstrating that the Egyptian government
failed to protect Asrail, or that Islamic fundamentalists and other groups are beyond
governmental control.  In support of her claim of past persecution, Asrail argues that she
sought police protection from her attackers but that the police did not express a
willingness to capture those who assaulted her.  She testified before the IJ that each time
she was assaulted, the Egyptian police came and filed a written report.  However, because
Asrail was unable to specifically describe her attackers, the reports were not detailed
enough to allow officials to identify or further pursue the perpetrators.
9.  The background information in the record indicates that although Coptic
Christians constitute a minority in Egypt, they are a group that the government actively
tries to protect.  Moreover, some of the documentary evidence illustrates recent efforts by
the Egyptian government to curb the activities of Islamic fundamentalists and other
militant groups.
10.  Despite Asrail’s uncorroborated claims of past persecution, she provided no
affidavits to substantiate any of the alleged assaults against her.  After initially departing
Egypt for the United States, Asrail traveled to Egypt twice more before returning to the
United States in April 2001.  See A.R. 132-138, 328; cf. 8 C.F.R. § 208.8(b)(indicating
9that an applicant who leaves the United States and returns to the country of claimed
persecution is presumed to have abandoned her application, absent compelling reasons).  
Moreover, Asrail did not apply for asylum on either of the first two trips she made to the
United States, and following her most recent arrival in this country, the petitioner waited
an additional two months to file her application for asylum.
11.  There is no evidence to support the contention that Asrail would be singled out
for persecution if returned to Egypt.  And the fact that she left the United States on two
separate occasions to return to Egypt also undermines any claim of a fear of future
persecution in that country.
12.  Asrail has provided neither allegations nor evidence that any of her family
members (her mother, two sisters, and younger brother, all of whom continue to live in
Egypt) have been subjected to persecution by fundamentalist groups in Egypt.
The petition for review will be denied.
